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PERSONAL JURISDICTION, COMPARATIVISM, AND
FORD
Scott Dodson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The March 2021 decision of Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth
Judicial District1 completes the triangulation of specific personal
jurisdiction under the U.S. Constitution.2 Combined with the Court’s
recent narrowing of general jurisdiction and longstanding adherence to
tag and consent-based jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction in the United
States is beginning to exhibit contours that are more defined and
concrete.3 What does this state of personal jurisdiction mean for future
developments? And how does it compare to the way other countries
have structured personal jurisdiction? This Article offers answers to
those questions.
II.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION UNTIL FORD

The doctrinal development of personal jurisdiction in the United
States through 2014 is well-trodden ground, so it will be summarized
only briefly to set up Ford and comparisons to other countries’ regimes.

* © 2022, Scott Dodson. All rights reserved. James Edgar Hervey Chair in Litigation, Geoffrey
C. Hazard Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law, and Director of the Center for Litigation and Courts,
UC Hastings College of the Law. J.D., Duke University School of Law, cum laude, 2000; B.A., Rice
University, cum laude, 1996. Expertise includes Civil Procedure, Federal Courts, Comparative Civil
Procedure, and Conflict of Laws. The author has earned the UC Hastings Leadership Award, 2020;
Adolph A. Tiscornia Scholarship Award, 2019; R.W. Harrison Summer Scholarship Stipend, 2013.
He has published seven books, dozens of scholarly articles, and has completed over one hundred
speaking engagements. Many thanks owed to Stefano Moscato, Rick Marcus, David Levine for
comments on an early draft, and to the participants at the Stetson Law Review symposium for
feedback.
1. 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1032 (2021).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 702–03 n.10 (1982) (determining that personal jurisdiction constraints are a “function of
the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause.”)
3. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1032.
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Until 1945, notions of physical presence and territorial sovereignty
governed U.S. personal jurisdiction.4 Under this regime, individual
defendants could be sued in the states where they resided, where they
were personally served, and where they consented to personal
jurisdiction through voluntary appearance in the forum court.5 Those
justifications for personal jurisdiction persist to this day.6 The consent
basis for jurisdiction has even expanded beyond voluntary appearance
in the forum court to include ex ante consent by contract.7
The case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,8 in 1945, marked
a dramatic expansion of the doctrine to allow personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents—especially business entities—when they had sufficient
“minimum contacts” with the forum state, such that personal
jurisdiction in the forum would not offend “traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.”9 The Court thus loosened personal
jurisdiction from moorings anchored solely on physical presence in the
forum state, and adopted an additional “minimum contacts” test for
personal jurisdiction founded on activities, effects, and fairness.10
Subsequent opinions distilled this standard into two species of
personal jurisdiction: general (or, all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific
(or, case-linked) jurisdiction.11 For many years, general jurisdiction was
thought to subject business entities to jurisdiction in all states where
they did “continuous and systematic” business, even if unrelated to the
cause of action, and even if the cause of action arose elsewhere.12 In
2011, however, the Court disavowed that test and imposed a far
narrower test for general jurisdiction, where the defendant’s contacts
were “so constant and pervasive”13 as to render the defendant
4. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878) (“The authority of every tribunal is necessarily
restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.”); id. at 722 (“[N]o State can
exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory.”).
5. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (residency); Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 729
(residency, consent, and tag).
6. See Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 617–18 (1990) (tag); Adam v. Saenger,
303 U.S. 59, 67–68 (1938) (voluntary appearance).
7. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991).
8. 326 U.S. 310, 321 (1945).
9. Id. at 316 (internal quotation marks omitted).
10. Id.
11. See Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2018).
12. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 134 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating
that the language had been “taught to generations of first-year law students”); Lea Brilmayer et al.,
A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 767 (1988) (“Courts currently measure
the sufficiency of unrelated business contacts between the forum state and the defendant with the
continuous and systematic test.”); Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction in the Trump Era, 87 FORDHAM L. REV.
73, 75 (2018) (explaining the broad reach of such a test).
13. Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 122 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564
U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).
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essentially “at home” in the forum state.14 The Court illustrated this test
with “paradigm” examples: domicile for an individual and place of
incorporation and principal place of business for a corporation.15
Subsequent cases confirmed the narrowness of this test.16 Absent
extraordinary circumstances in which the functional home of the
defendant is different from the formal home,17 general jurisdiction today
essentially expands upon the pre-1945 concept of residency.
Until 2014, the courts employed specific jurisdiction episodically
and ad hoc. The Court required that the defendant’s forum contacts had
to give rise to or be related to the plaintiff’s cause of action, but the Court
did not establish how directly connected to the forum the defendant’s
conduct had to be,18 nor did the Court define how related to the cause of
action the defendant’s forum contacts had to be.19 The Court articulated
catchphrases as guideposts: the defendant had to “purposefully
avail[]”20 itself of the forum state, such that it would be “reasonably
foreseeable” that its activities could cause harm there.21 The Court also
noted, in specific-jurisdiction cases, that personal jurisdiction
encompassed five factors, sometimes referred to as the five “fairness
factors,” which could raise or lower the minimum level of contacts
needed to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction.22
In 2014, the Court decided a series of cases that attempted to clarify
the contours of specific jurisdiction’s minimum-contacts test. These
cases have elevated the importance of the Court’s earlier statement that
specific jurisdiction depends upon the “relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”23 Geometrically, the contours
of this formulation are triangular, with the claim, the forum, and the
defendant’s conduct at the apex of each triangle point, as shown in
Figure 1:

14. Id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 564 U.S. at 919).
15. Id.
16. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559 (2017); Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 142.
17. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447–48 (1952).
18. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).
19. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984).
20. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
21. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (alternating between
use of the phrase “reasonably foreseeable” and “reasonably calculated” to describe the same
standard).
22. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1985). The five fairness factors
are the burden on the defendant, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining effective relief, the interest of
the forum state, the policies of other states or nations, and the judicial system’s interest in efficiency.
Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292); see also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113–15.
23. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.
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FIGURE 1:

FORUM

DEFENDANT’S
CONDUCT

CLAIM

Starting in 2014, the Court began to supply more concrete legal
tests for each of the triangle’s sides. In Walden v. Fiore,24 the Court
considered the left side of the triangle: the connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the forum. There, the defendant, a Georgia
police officer, seized cash from Las Vegas poker players when the
players arrived at the Atlanta airport on a layover stop during a flight
from Puerto Rico to Nevada.25 The players sued the officer in Nevada for
wrongfully seizing their cash.26 The Court held that even though the
officer may have known that the poker players were from Nevada, and
would have suffered harm in Nevada of not having access to their cash,
Nevada could not exercise personal jurisdiction over them because their
conduct was not sufficiently connected to Nevada.27 The Court stated
that the defendant’s conduct must be connected to the forum state by
more than just the plaintiffs’ connections.28 Rather, the “contacts that the
‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum” establish the connection

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014).
Id. at 279–80.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 288–89.
Id. at 291.
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between the defendant and the forum.29 Walden thus refines the more
generalized “purposeful availment” test.30
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California,31 the Court
tackled the right side of the triangle: the relationship between the forum
and the claim. Plaintiffs from around the country sued Bristol-Myers
Squibb in California state court for injuries resulting from their ingestion
of the drug Plavix, which Bristol-Myers Squibb sold nationwide through
a distributor.32 The plaintiffs all claimed to have obtained, taken, and
been injured by the drug in their home states.33 The non-Californian
plaintiffs argued that California had personal jurisdiction over BristolMyers Squibb for their claims because Bristol-Myers Squibb had
significant contacts involving Plavix in California.34
The Supreme Court rejected that argument.35 Although the
California court clearly had personal jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers
Squibb for the California plaintiffs’ claims, the non-Californian plaintiffs’
claims were different: “[t]he mere fact that other plaintiffs were
prescribed, obtained, and ingested Plavix in California—and allegedly
sustained the same injuries as did the nonresidents—does not allow the
State to assert specific jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims.”36 In
the Court’s words, “[w]hat is needed—and what is missing here—is a
connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.”37
As observed after Bristol-Myers Squibb, “specific jurisdiction
requires a direct link between not only the forum and the defendant but
also between the forum and the claim.”38 Walden and Bristol-Myers
Squibb helped solidify the two sides of the triangle.
The base of the triangle was left. Previously, the Court had set out
the legal test for the relationship between defendant conduct and the
plaintiff’s claim: that the claim “must arise out of or relate to” the

29. Id. at 284 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)).
30. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021) (citing Burger
King Corp., 471 U.S. at 462, 475). A key older case that supplies foundational gloss on “purposeful
availment” is World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
31. 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1787 (2017).
32. Id. at 1777–78.
33. Id. at 1778.
34. Brief for Petitioner at 18–20, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773
(2017) (No. 16-466).
35. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1783–84.
36. Id. at 1781.
37. Id.
38. Dodson, supra note 11, at 17.
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defendant’s contacts.39 “Arise out of” suggests causality, which many of
the prior specific-jurisdiction cases easily satisfied. But the Court had
never decided what other kinds of contacts might also meet the conductclaim-connection requirements of this part of the triangle.
III.

FORD AND THE TRIANGULATION OF SPECIFIC
JURISDICTION

In March 2021, the Court completed the triangulation of specific
jurisdiction. In Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District,40 the
Supreme Court considered what contacts were related enough to the
cause of action to count for purposes of minimum contacts.41 Ford
resolved two separate cases. In one case, a Montana resident died after
an accident while driving her 1996 Ford Explorer in Montana.42 In the
other, a Minnesota resident riding in a 1994 Ford Crown Victoria
sustained serious injuries in an accident in Minnesota.43 Both plaintiffs
sued Ford in their home states for state-law claims under specific
jurisdiction.44 Because Ford is incorporated in Delaware and
headquartered in Michigan,45 Ford moved to dismiss both complaints for
lack of personal jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment.46
The evidence revealed that Ford directly targeted Montana with
marketing efforts for Explorers through its advertising in the state; its
thirty-six dealerships in the state; its sales of Explorers and their parts
in the state; and its repair, replacement, and recall services for Explorers
in the state.47 The evidence revealed that Ford directly targeted
Minnesota with marketing efforts related to Crown Victorias through its
marketing and advertising in Minnesota, its eighty-four dealerships in
Minnesota, and its sale of thousands of 1994 Crown Victorias in
Minnesota.48 With respect to both states, Ford both encouraged owners
to keep their Fords for many years after purchase, and encouraged a
robust resale market for its vehicles in those states.49 Thus, it was
39. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1786 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985);
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.
40. 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1032 (2021).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1023.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1022.
46. Id. at 1023, 1030.
47. Id. at 1023, 1028.
48. Id. at 1022, 1024, 1028.
49. Id. at 1028–29.
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undisputed that Ford did substantial business in both Montana and
Minnesota related to the types of vehicles at issue.50
Nevertheless, Ford argued that the courts hearing these cases
lacked specific jurisdiction over Ford because Ford did not design,
manufacture, or sell, in the forum states, the particular cars involved in
the accidents.51 Ford designed that particular Explorer in Michigan,
manufactured it in Kentucky, and sold it in Washington.52 Ford designed
that particular Crown Victoria in Michigan, manufactured it in Canada,
and sold it in North Dakota.53 Ford had no direct involvement in bringing
those particular cars into Montana and Minnesota.54 According to Ford,
therefore, those states’ courts could not exercise specific jurisdiction
over Ford in those lawsuits.55 All of the state courts rejected Ford’s
argument, and Ford sought certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, which
granted review in 2020.56
The Supreme Court also rejected Ford’s argument and held that the
Montana and Minnesota courts could exercise specific jurisdiction over
Ford in those cases.57 Justice Kagan, writing for four other justices,
reiterated the modern triumvirate: personal jurisdiction depends upon
the connections between the claims, the defendant’s conduct, and the
forum state.58 She quickly dispensed with the left and right sides of the
triangle.59 The claims were connected to the forum states because,
unlike the nonresident claims in Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Ford plaintiffs
were residents of the forum states, and the cars caused injuries there.60
Further, Ford’s conduct had substantial connections with the forum
states because, unlike in Walden, Ford purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting business activities in both states.61
The Court then turned to the base of the specific-jurisdiction
triangle. Was Ford’s conduct sufficiently related to the particular claim
at issue?62 Ford argued no, because its forum activities did not
contribute to the causes of action arising in those forums.63
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 1026.
Id.
Id. at 1023.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1023–24.
Id. at 1032.
Id. at 1024.
Id. at 1026.
Id. at 1031.
Id. at 1026, 1031.
Id. at 1026.
Id.
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The Court rejected Ford’s argument.64 Personal jurisdiction does
require a connection between the defendant’s forum contacts and the
cause of action, but the required connection need not be strict
causality.65 The forum contacts must give rise to, “or relate to,” the cause
of action.66 Relatedness has limits, but it is not limited only to contacts
that give rise to the suit.67
And here, the Court reasoned, Ford’s contacts with the forum states
were related to the causes of action: “Ford had systematically served a
market in Montana and Minnesota for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs
allege malfunctioned and injured them in those States.”68 Accordingly,
Ford’s substantial conduct in the forum states pertaining to the types of
cars at issue in the accidents were related to the claims.69
Ford thus completes the triangle. Each modern case—Walden,
Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Ford—supplies clearer standards for each of
the triangle’s sides, as depicted below in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2:

FORUM

DEFENDANT’S
CONDUCT

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1032.

Ford

CLAIM
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AFTER FORD

This Article offers six observations about Ford and the future of
specific jurisdiction. First, Ford does little to clarify whether the five
fairness factors are still good law and, if so, how they operate within the
specific-jurisdiction framework. In Burger King and Asahi, the Court
treated the fairness factors as a bifurcated analysis that could raise or
lower the minimum-contacts bar.70 Bristol-Myers Squibb took a different
track by referring to “a variety of interests,” including the plaintiff’s
choice of forum and the forum’s interests. Bristol-Myers Squibb focused,
however, on the “burden on the defendant,” which it phrased in terms of
“the practical problems resulting from litigating in the forum, but it also
encompasses the more abstract matter of submitting to the coercive
power of a State that may have little legitimate interest in the claims in
question.”71 Bristol-Myers Squibb then focused on that latter point, which
it equated with the side of the triangle connecting the forum to the
claim.72
Ford is even more vague about the fairness factors. It does not
mention them by name, nor does it analyze them as a separate group. 73
In the course of its discussion, Ford does obliquely refer to three of them
in ways scattered throughout the opinion. First, as for the burden on the
defendant, the Court says, “allowing jurisdiction in these cases treats
Ford fairly. . . .”74 Second, as for the interest of the plaintiff, “the plaintiffs
brought suit in the most natural State.”75 Finally, as for the forum states’
interests, “[t]hose States have significant interests at stake.”76 After Ford,
it is unclear whether the fairness factors retain their status as a discrete
inquiry, what work they do in the test, and whether all of them remain
good law.
Second, because Ford did not implicate nettlesome issues of virtual
contacts and the complications of technology, the majority did not
consider whether current doctrine meets the challenges of the
technology age.77 The Internet remains the elephant in the room, and the

70. See supra text accompanying note 22.
71. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (internal
quotations omitted).
72. Id. at 1781.
73. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1024–25.
74. Id. at 1029.
75. Id. at 1031.
76. Id. at 1030.
77. Id. at 1028 n.4 (“[W]e do not here consider internet transactions, which may raise doctrinal
questions of their own.”).
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doctrine will not truly be settled until the Court considers how it applies
to virtual contacts.
Third, the Court backed away from the debate aired in J. McIntyre
Machinery v. Nicastro78 between a consent-based theory of personal
jurisdiction and a fairness-based theory of personal jurisdiction.79 Ford
sidestepped both theories and instead framed personal jurisdiction in
terms of reciprocity (purposeful availment) and notice (reasonable
foreseeability):
Our decision in International Shoe founded specific jurisdiction on an
idea of reciprocity between a defendant and a State: When (but only
when) a company “exercises the privilege of conducting activities
within a state”—thus “enjoying the benefits and protection of its
laws”—the State may hold the company to account for related
misconduct. Later decisions have added that our doctrine similarly
provides defendants with “fair warning”—knowledge that a
“particular activity may subject it to the jurisdiction of a foreign
sovereign.” A defendant can thus structure its primary conduct to
lessen or avoid exposure to a given State’s courts. 80

Fourth, the Court reaffirmed personal jurisdiction’s connection to
interstate federalism, a principle seemingly dormant since 198281
before its revival in Bristol-Myers Squibb.82 As the Court in Ford put it:
And this Court has considered alongside defendants’ interests those
of the States in relation to each other. One State’s “sovereign power
to try” a suit, we have recognized, may prevent “sister States” from
exercising their like authority. The law of specific jurisdiction thus

78. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011).
79. Compare id. at 880 (Kennedy, J.) (dispensing with “[f]reeform notions of fundamental
fairness” in favor of acts that manifest an intention to “submit to a State’s authority”), with id. at
901–02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that “the plurality’s notion that consent is the animating
concept draws no support from controlling decisions of this Court” and instead interpreting
precedent to “g[i]ve prime place to reason and fairness”).
80. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (internal citations omitted).
81. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982)
(“The restriction on state sovereign power described in World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. . . . must be
seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause.
That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes
no mention of federalism concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated as an
independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to waive the
personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions cannot change the powers of sovereignty,
although the individual can subject himself to powers from which he may otherwise be protected.”).
82. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780–81 (2017).
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seeks to ensure that States with “little legitimate interest” in a suit do
not encroach on States more affected by the controversy. 83

Fifth, Justice Gorsuch penned a concurring opinion, decrying the
current test as divorced from an originalist view of personal jurisdiction,
as prone to vagaries in application and providing special treatment to
artificial business entities.84 Justice Gorsuch even seems willing to
support reviving the old “doing business” heuristic as a proxy for
corporate “presence.”85 The Court rejected that proposition as
inconsistent with the limits of specific jurisdiction,86 but Justice
Gorsuch’s point more so invited a rethinking of the entire doctrine in line
with originalism rather than precedent.87 It remains to be seen just how
many justices are willing to embark on a course that would jettison
seventy-five years of precedent (even if International Shoe88 did just
that).
Sixth, the most important takeaway was what the Court didn’t do.
Ford was an easy case. Ford’s contacts in the forum state were
significant; no unfairness in terms of burdens or expectations could
possibly be argued.89 And the cause of action arose there.90 As Justice
Alito suggested, Ford’s contacts may even have given rise to the cause of
action there because of Ford’s efforts to make sure people, like the
plaintiffs, drove their Ford vehicles in those states.91 So the Court’s
rejection of Ford’s argument against personal jurisdiction was, if not
surprising, of profound importance. Had Ford’s argument succeeded,
specific jurisdiction would have been dramatically narrowed.92 Few
cases would meet all three sides of the triangle. Companies could game
the market by selling into only one state while advertising and
promoting in all of them, thereby reaping the benefits of those many
states’ markets without subjecting themselves to suit there. Ultimately,

83. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (internal citations omitted).
84. Id. at 1035, 1038 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 1036.
86. Id. at 1027 n.3 (majority opinion).
87. Justice Alito hinted that he might have the same willingness. Id. at 1032 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“[T]here are grounds for questioning the standard that the Court adopted in
International Shoe. And there are also reasons to wonder whether the case law we have developed
since that time is well suited for the way in which business is now conducted.”) (internal citation
omitted).
88. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
89. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1022.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring).
92. See Linda Sandstrom Simard, Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes,
Ford’s Hidden Fairness Defect, 106 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 45, 50 (2020).
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the biggest effect of Ford may end up being its rejection of the
restrictions on specific jurisdiction Ford advanced.93
V.

REFLECTIONS FROM AROUND THE GLOBE

Where does Ford put the United States on the global map?
Elsewhere, I have argued that recent decisions indicated that the Court
might be paying closer attention to the way other countries address
personal jurisdiction (or, jurisdiction to adjudicate, as often styled in
other countries).94 In the doctrine, general jurisdiction moves since
2011 in the United States appear to converge with personal jurisdiction
in the rest of the world.95 The vast majority of other countries have long
considered “doing business” jurisdiction exorbitant.96 By contrast, the
“at home” test, with its paradigm manifestations, is consonant with the
domicile basis for personal jurisdiction largely followed in other
countries.97 These convergences of U.S. general jurisdiction with the
norms of other countries has made joining international conventions on
judgment recognition and enforcement a real possibility.98
But there is little reference to comparativism in Ford. The opinion
itself tends to entrench certain differences between the United States
and other countries. For example, Ford reaffirms Bristol-Myers Squibb’s
rejection of pendent personal jurisdiction in the single-defendant case,99
which is inconsistent with EU law and many individual European
countries’ laws.100 Ford also reaffirms Walden’s holding that specific
jurisdiction requires something more than just the cause of action
arising in the forum state,101 which is in tension with the European

93. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026.
94. Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction in Comparative Context, 68 AM. J. COMP. L. 702 (2020);
e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 141–42 (2014) (noting the consistency between the “at
home” test of general jurisdiction and the domicile-based foundation of judicial jurisdiction
elsewhere); see also J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 909, 909 n.16 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting tension between the lack of personal jurisdiction at the place of
tort injury in Nicastro and the grant of jurisdiction at the place of tort injury supplied in other
countries).
95. Dodson, supra note 94, at 711.
96. OSCAR CHASE ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 672–73 (2d ed. 2017).
97. Dodson, supra note 94, at 715–16; Linda J. Silberman, Goodyear and Nicastro: Observations
from a Transnational and Comparative Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 591, 608 (2012).
98. Dodson, supra note 94, at 715–16.
99. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1030–31 (2021).
100. Dodson, supra note 94, at 717.
101. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1030–31.
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custom of allowing specific jurisdiction in the country where a
manufacturer’s product causes harm.102
And Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion even suggests a
willingness to move personal jurisdiction in ways without regard to—
and diametrically opposed to—the jurisdictional norms in other
countries. In particular, Justice Gorsuch’s invitation to return to a style
of the old “doing business” jurisdiction for corporations and other
organizations would be a significant break from the global norm.103
Justice Gorsuch also hints at expanding tag jurisdiction to business
organizations whose agents were served in the forum state while on
corporate business,104 a significant expansion of a basis for personal
jurisdiction long deemed exorbitant by most of the rest of the world.105
It is not surprising that Ford largely ignores the jurisdictional laws
of other countries. The federal structure of the United States—with
separate state sovereignties and separate state courts—infuses U.S.
personal jurisdiction with concerns for interstate federalism that few
other countries share.106 Equally important, U.S. personal jurisdiction is
a judicially-created doctrine generated primarily by just two words—
”due process”—in the U.S. Constitution, burdening the Supreme Court
with the difficult task of developing rules under this faintest of
guideposts in an ad hoc and fact-bound way.107 By contrast, most other
countries codify, in some detail, the limits on their courts’ adjudicatory
authority.108
102. Dodson, supra note 94, at 713–14. Some other countries allow personal jurisdiction in the
plaintiff’s home state in consumer claims or internet-based torts. Id.
103. Justice Gorsuch also might open the door to greater willingness to extend consent-based
personal jurisdiction to state business-registration statutes. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1036, 1038–39
(Gorsuch, J., concurring). For commentary on the issue, see 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1069.2 n.25 (4th ed. 2017); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra
Burke Robertson, A New State Registration Act: Legislating a Longer Arm for Personal Jurisdiction,
57 HARV. J. LEGIS. 377, 388–94 (2020).
104. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1038, 1038 n.9 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
105. Dodson, supra note 94, at 711–12.
106. Id. at 710. This concern is directly implicated when a state’s own courts attempt to assert
personal jurisdiction, and it is indirectly implicated through Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure when a federal court attempts to assert personal jurisdiction, though there are some
exceptions. See Scott Dodson, Plaintiff Personal Jurisdiction and Venue Transfer, 117 MICH. L. REV.
1463, 1474 n.67 (2019) (identifying instances in which Congress has supplied federal courts with
nationwide personal jurisdiction). For the argument that interstate federalism should be far less
concerning for U.S. lawsuits against foreign parties, see William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal
Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1205, 1209 (2018).
107. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701–03 n.10 (1982)
(identifying the Due Process Clauses as the source of constitutional constraints on personal
jurisdiction).
108. E.g., European Regulation No. 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1
(codifying limits on EU nations’ jurisdiction).
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On that latter point, Ford’s concurring opinions provide an
interesting characterization of the majority’s interpretation of the
“related to” prong of specific jurisdiction as akin to statutory
interpretation, even though the “related to” standard is grounded in case
precedent rather than a statute.109 Codification of adjudicatory
jurisdiction, rampant in the rest of the world, helps avoid the difficulties
inherent in judge-developed doctrine.110 In the United States,
codification is eminently feasible; after all, state long-arm “statutes”111
and Rule 4 supply codified limits on the jurisdictional reach of both state
courts and federal courts.112 The Constitution’s Due Process Clauses and
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of them have taken on an outsized
leadership role in defining U.S. personal jurisdiction, but that need not
be the case.113 If personal jurisdiction were driven by sub-constitutional
codifications, the Court could take a back seat and allow the principles
of due process to guard against overreach in unique cases rather than do
all the work of perfecting personal jurisdiction in the first instance.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Ford, the newest casebook-worthy opinion on personal jurisdiction
from the Supreme Court, completes the triangulation of specific
jurisdiction and offers some clarity in the doctrine going forward.114 Its
impact on the looming collision of personal jurisdiction and the Internet,
and its implications for the development of global norms of personal
jurisdiction, remain unclear.

109. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1033 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1034 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
110. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 94, at 720 (stating that the judge-developed doctrine is “likely
to evolve in unpredictable ways in the near term”). Cf. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 134
(2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating that the Court’s new standard for general jurisdiction
would upset what had been “taught to generations of first-year law students”).
111. See Zachary D. Clopton, Long Arm “Statutes,” 23 GREEN BAG 2D 89, 90 (2020).
112. FED. R. CIV. P. 4.
113. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702–03 n.10 (1982).
114. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026–27, 1032.

